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The McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) is a think tank based in Washington, D.C. founded 
in 1990 with the objective of analyzing international productivity levels from both 
economic and management perspectives.  MGI uses microeconomic analysis on a sector-
by-sector level to study the effects that industry decisions ultimately have on national 
productivity.  For the most part the productivity drivers identified by MGI can be 
grouped into three broad areas: competitive factors (concentration, trade protection, 
deregulation, minimum wages, work rules, and zoning laws); managerial factors (best 
practice, human capital, capital intensity, and information technology); and demand 
factors (average income, cyclical factors, and consumer preferences).  This paper 
examines these factors in an attempt to shed light on the causes of Canada-U.S. 
productivity differences at the industry level.  Competitive factors may explain the poor 
productivity performance of the Canadian financial and cultural service industries relative 
to their U.S. counterparts, and likewise may explain the high productivity levels of some 
natural resource industries in Canada relative to the United States.  Managerial factors, 
especially the implementation of new technologies and related processes, may be 
important in explaining the poor productivity growth in Canada relative to the United 
States in service industries such as retail trade.  Given the similarities between Canada 
and the United States, the findings of the MGI studies cannot be indiscriminately applied 
to Canada-U.S. productivity differences at the industry level.  However, the MGI studies 
do put forward a number of useful working hypotheses for analyzing these differences. 
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The McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) is a think tank based in Washington, D.C. 
founded in 1990 by McKinsey & Company with the objective of analyzing international 
productivity levels from both economic and management perspectives.  Over the last 
fifteen years, MGI has studied most of the world’s major economies.  In each case, MGI 
uses microeconomic analysis on a sector-by-sector level to study the effects that industry 
decisions ultimately have on national productivity.  This paper seeks to synthesize some 
of these findings to see what comparisons and potential lessons can be drawn for Canada-
U.S. productivity level differences on an industry basis. 
 
Time and again, the McKinsey Global Institute’s studies have returned to the 
same story in trying to explain productivity gaps between countries: a lack of competitive 
intensity.  To the extent that certain European and Japanese sectors seem to consistently 
trail the United States in productivity, these sectors are nearly always characterized by a 
small number of domestic firms who engage in little price or service competition because 
of regulatory protection in the form of product market restrictions and trade barriers.  
MGI finds that such restrictions lead to managerial complacency, a consequent lack of 
innovation in production processes, and ultimately to a productivity performance below 
that of the technological leader.  Potential factors related to competition that have been 
identified by MGI as directly affecting productivity are the following. 
 
·  Concentration: A high market share held by a small number of firms is not 
necessarily inconsistent with intense competition.  Concentration can improve 
productivity through achieving economies of scale, and it can also boost 
productivity if it allows a small number of large firms to compete intensely with 
each other.  Examples of highly concentrated yet highly competitive industries 
include the Dutch banking industry and the Swedish automobile industry. 
 
·  Trade Protection: Tariffs and quotas reduce productivity through shielding 
industries from international competition and so making the adoption of global 
best practices unnecessary.  The automobile industry in Germany, France and the 
United Kingdom, the food processing industry in Japan, and many Swedish 
service industries are all examples highlighted by MGI of industries whose 
productivity performance has been hindered by trade protection. 
 
·  Deregulation: MGI highlights the airline, telecommunications and banking 
industries as cases in which deregulation has boosted productivity, and in which 
countries that have chosen to delay or forgo deregulation have consequently 
suffered lower productivity levels than the early deregulators. 
   vi   
Other competition-related factors can affect productivity in a more indirect 
fashion. 
 
·  Minimum Wages: Higher wages typically have the effect of reducing the number 
of low-skill jobs, as the benefit of these low-skill services is outweighed by the 
higher cost of providing them.  While this has the effect of raising conventionally-
measured average labour productivity, MGI argues that overall “service 
productivity” is negatively affected because the range of services that is offered 
shrinks. 
 
·  Work Rules: MGI recognizes that some labour market inflexibilities can be 
beneficial.  However, collective agreement terms that are not adjustable to market 
realities can negatively affect productivity by preventing productivity-enhancing 
reorganizations of work. 
 
·  Zoning Laws: Some European countries have zoning regulations that have a 
negative impact on productivity by making it difficult for firms to purchase 
parcels of land of a required size, and through creating an artificial scarcity of 
land and thereby making land overly expensive.  This affects productivity because 
high rents hinder the ability of smaller firms to innovate, and because larger firms 
have difficulties achieving optimal scale. 
 
Perhaps even more important than the market conditions under which a firm 
operates is the way its managers choose to react to those conditions.  Competitiveness is 
the main driver of managerial innovation, but that managerial innovation (or lack thereof) 
is what affects productivity, first at the firm level, then the industry level, and ultimately 
at the national level.  MGI makes the following observations related to managerial 
innovation. 
 
·  Best Practice: Managers need to be aware of best practices in a given industry, 
and be prepared to implement them.  MGI states that sufficient exposure to 
competition will ensure that this is the case. 
 
·  Human Capital: MGI finds little evidence that labour skills at the production 
level differ greatly across countries.  However, the qualifications of managers can 
have a significant impact on productivity, through entrepreneurship and the 
training of production workers. 
 
·  Marketing: MGI finds that the U.S. telecommunications sector’s productivity 
performance has been positively affected through marketing, since the resulting 
greater demand for telecommunication services means that there is greater output 
for a given investment in fixed capital. 
 
·  Information Technology: Although few would dispute that investment in 
information technology (IT) can have a significant impact on productivity growth, 
MGI concludes that realizing its full benefit requires an appropriate application.    vii   
In addition to the effect of IT use on productivity growth, the presence and strong 
productivity performance of industries producing IT goods also positively affect 
overall manufacturing productivity growth. 
 
·  Capital Intensity: MGI finds that improvements in capital intensity are a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for improvements in productivity.  This is 
because increasing the amount of capital per worker does not necessarily mean 
that the capital is being used efficiently.  Improvements in capital productivity are 
often dependent on other managerial and competitive factors. 
 
The final category of productivity determinants is demand factors.  If a 
competitive market forces a firm to innovate in order to create better goods and services 
at lower prices (and costs), then there should be an increase in demand for those 
improved products, which should more than justify the initial costs of innovation and 
increase firm profits.  There are other demand factors besides this general desire for 
improved goods that can affect a firm’s decisions and thus productivity.  Briefly, income 
levels, cyclical demand factors, and general consumer preferences can all affect the 
format, output level, and ultimately productivity of a firm. 
 
The McKinsey Global Institute has not produced a report on Canadian 
productivity. However, the findings from the McKinsey productivity studies on industry 
productivity differentials between the United States and a number of major developed 
and developing countries may have relevance for the explanation of industry productivity 
differentials between the United States and Canada.  In some respects, the Canadian 
economy is a bit of a hybrid between the U.S. free-market system and the more sheltered, 
socially-conscious systems of countries like France or Sweden.  Canada is more globally-
exposed than most EU countries, yet it also retains a certain level of trade protection and 
restricts entry to some domestic sectors.  It also has a more developed welfare state than 
the United States in terms of more government control of social programs such as health 
care and pensions.  Differences between Canada and the United States in these areas can 
be examined in the context of the productivity drivers identified by the MGI studies in an 
attempt to shed light on the factors behind Canada-U.S. labour productivity gaps at the 
industry level. 
 
In terms of competitive factors, Canadian service-sector firms may be less 
exposed to competition than U.S. firms and have a smaller market in which to operate.  
The poor productivity performance of financial and cultural industries is consistent with 
this hypothesis.  Likewise, the strong relative performance of Canada’s natural resource 
industries may be related to the intense international competition they face.  However, 
other competitive factors are quite similar across the two countries, such as zoning laws 
and minimum wages. 
 
Many managerial and consumer behaviour factors are also similar across the two 
countries.  One area in which Canada appears to be lagging the United States to a large 
degree is the retail trade sector.  It appears that managers in the Canadian retail industry 
have not adopted new technologies and processes as rapidly as their U.S. counterparts.    viii   
Wal-Mart has lead the U.S. retail trade industry in this regard, spurring other firms to 
innovate through competitive pressure.  Apparently Wal-Mart has not yet had this effect 
in Canada. 
 
Given the similarities between Canada and the United States, which are much 
greater than between the United States and Europe, Japan, Brazil, and India, the findings 
of the MGI studies cannot be indiscriminately applied to Canada-U.S. productivity 
differences at the industry level.  Further work is needed to dig more deeply into the 
Canada-U.S. industry productivity gaps, although the MGI studies do put forward a 




  The McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) is a think tank based in Washington, D.C. 
founded in 1990 by McKinsey & Company with the objective of analyzing international 
productivity levels from both economic and management perspectives.  Over the last 
fifteen years, MGI has studied most of the world’s major economies, from the open and 
mostly-open models of the United States and United Kingdom to the more sheltered 
economies of Western Europe and Sweden to the export-intensive yet heavily protected 
Japanese system.  In each case, MGI uses microeconomic analysis on a sector-by-sector 
level to study the effects that industry decisions ultimately have on national productivity.  
In most cases, large productivity gaps between countries can be explained by market 
conditions and managerial decisions at the sectoral level.  MGI argues that productivity 
growth stems from innovative managerial behaviour, which itself is necessitated by a 
competitive market.  In this respect, the United States sets productivity benchmarks in 
most sectors by virtue of being the world’s most competitive economy.  This paper seeks 
to synthesize some of these findings to see what comparisons and potential lessons can be 
drawn for Canada-U.S. productivity level differences on an industry basis. 
 
  This paper has two main sections.  The first deals with the findings of the 
McKinsey Global Institute.  This section outlines factors that affect competitive intensity 
within a country, both in terms of direct regulations such as trade protection and indirect 
regulations such as minimum wages; looks at how managers react to these competitive 
conditions and deals with the concept of adopting global best practice to improve 
productivity, as well as the potential impact of information technology (IT) investment; 
and examines how demand factors can also influence the behaviour of firms and 
industries and therefore their level of productivity.  The second section outlines the 
elements of MGI’s analysis that can be applied to Canada itself. 
 
 
Section One: Synthesis of MGI Studies 
 
I. Competitive Factors 
 
  Time and again, the McKinsey Global Institute’s studies have returned to the 
same story in trying to explain productivity gaps between countries: a lack of competitive 
intensity.  To the extent that certain European and Japanese sectors seem to consistently 
trail the United States in productivity, these sectors are nearly always characterized by a 
small number of domestic firms who engage in little price or service competition because 
                                                 
1 This report was prepared as part of a project undertaken by the Centre for the Study of Living Standards 
for the Conference Board of Canada.  This project involved an in-depth study of productivity levels and 
their determinants in a number of industries in Canada and the United States, aimed at providing insights 
on the causes of the overall Canada-U.S. productivity and income gaps.  The results of this project are 
published in the 2004 edition of the Conference Board of Canada’s annual publication Performance and 
Potential.  All studies by the McKinsey Global Institute discussed in this report are available for free 
download from the McKinsey website, at www.mckinsey.com/knowledge/mgi.    2 
of regulatory protection in the form of product market restrictions and trade barriers.  
This is true in the German automotive market, which has always faced substantial import 
tariffs by itself and through the EU; it is true in the Swedish construction industry, which 
faces supply oligopolies and cartels for most of its inputs; it is true in the enormous 
Japanese food processing sector and countless other markets throughout the world.  In 
every case, protection from competition, domestic or foreign, has led to managerial 
complacency and a lack of innovation in production processes, the end result being that 
the United States, the world’s most exposed country to domestic and international 
competitive forces, has surged ahead in productivity because of its ability to adapt to 
global best practices in both manufacturing and services.  Competitive intensity almost 
always drives managerial innovation, and so MGI has evaluated the effects that both 
direct and indirect regulations can have on competitive intensity.  Direct regulations 
include concentration laws, trade protection, and conversely, deregulation.  Indirect 
regulations include minimum wage standards, union work rules, and zoning laws. 
 
A. Concentration  
 
  The 1997 MGI study on the banking sector in the Netherlands found it to be the 
most productive in the world.  Why?  Its relatively high level of concentration.  
Paradoxically, such a situation is not necessarily contradictory to the idea of market 
competition.  It is true that some of Europe’s state monopolies and oligopolies have been 
non-competitive, but that has primarily been because of barriers to foreign entry and 
product market restrictions (such as pricing rules, hours of operation restrictions, and 
zoning laws), not simply market share.  As markets that are open to global competition 
have shown, sometimes it only takes two firms to generate intense competition.  In 
Sweden, Volvo and Scania alone have been able to achieve world-class productivity 
levels by competing with each other and with foreign firms. 
 
  The same is true in Dutch banking, where concentration has improved 
competition and productivity, and not decreased them as might be expected.  The top 
three banks in the Netherlands control 75 per cent of the market, as opposed to only 10 
per cent for the top three in the United States.  Once the Postbank introduced its system 
of electronic payments, the other banks joined together to create a competing payments 
system and the final result of this collaboration was the most efficient, standardized IT 
system in the banking world.  As well, concentration in Dutch banking has been aided by 
a concentration in Dutch population density.  While the Netherlands has more branches 
per square kilometre than either the United States or France (its nearest productivity 
competitors), due to its small geographic area it also has fewer branches per capita 
because sector concentration has prevented excessive competition through branch 
expansion, making the Netherlands’ branch banking system also the world’s most 
efficient.  The German banking system, for example, has a similar electronic payments 
system to the Netherlands but achieves barely half its labour productivity because of its 
enormous branch system. 
 
  The United States actually has the most efficient centralized processing in the 
banking industry.  It falls behind the Netherlands in overall labour productivity, however,   3 
partly because of its dispersed population and its larger branch system.  To a certain 
extent, this does illustrate a natural advantage on the part of the Netherlands.  At the same 
time, however, the banking industry in the United States is among the most fragmented in 
the world as most banks compete only at the state level, even after some deregulation in 
the 1980s.  This lack of concentration has made IT integration difficult and costly.  Even 
barring that, American consumers have been unique in still preferring chequing accounts 
to electronic payments. 
 
  In highly concentrated sectors, the impact of managerial or technological 
innovation is usually greater, as it is crucial to achieve economies of scale.  In their report 
on productivity growth in France and Germany, the McKinsey Global Institute (2002) 
advocate consolidation in several sectors, including telecommunications, road freight, 
and especially banking.  This was based on the experience of the banking system in the 
Netherlands, where the advantages of consolidation in terms of IT adoption had become 
apparent.  This has also been the experience of American wholesaling, where 
productivity growth reached record levels in the late 1990s as consolidation allowed for 
the widespread adoption of warehouse automation.  As MGI point out, while low 
competitive intensity may create a situation of concentration, concentration in and of 
itself does not necessarily create a situation of low competitive intensity. 
 
B. Trade Protection 
 
  While there are a number of indirect ways to shelter domestic producers within a 
sector, there is no more obvious direct method than through trade protection in the form 
of tariffs or import quotas.  While trade controls may serve to promote a domestic sector 
within a country, that sector generally ends up being non-competitive and well behind in 
global productivity because of its lack of exposure to global best practice.  Going back to 
their 1993 study on manufacturing, it has always been the conclusion of MGI that trade 
protection is rarely desirable from a long-term perspective.  In the automotive industry, 
for example, U.S. car producers were for many years sheltered from Japanese 
competition, and were thus able to survive domestically without having to achieve 
Japanese productivity levels.  It was only when the market was finally opened up that 
they achieved close to the productivity levels realized by Japan.  The German auto 
market, meanwhile, remained sheltered and has always trailed the other two significantly 
in terms of productivity.  The EU currently puts a 10 per cent tariff on imported vehicles, 
so the automotive sectors in France and the United Kingdom are in the same position. 
 
  Trade protection can be the primary cause of reduced productivity or just a 
secondary factor.  For example, barriers to trade are only a secondary factor in explaining 
the low productivity levels in the U.S. steel industry relative to that in Germany and 
Japan, since all three countries have traditionally protected their steel industries.  The 
primary reason that the United States trails Japan and Germany is thus not tariffs, but 
rather the U.S. “minimill” system that lends itself poorly to capital investment.  Japan’s 
steel industry has been the most protected but also the most productive because of its 
process innovations.  On the other hand, trade barriers are the primary cause of lower 
productivity in the EU electronics industry relative to the U.S. and Japanese electronics   4 
industries.  Productivity levels in the electronics industry are relatively equal in the 
United States and Japan, as a result of global competition.  In contrast, EU-subsidized 
computer producers like Siemens have always trailed badly.   
 
Similarly, the level of labour productivity in the Japanese food processing 
industry has been less than a third of the U.S. level because of excessive protection.  
Although Japan initially protected most of its sectors as “infant industries” in the early 
post-war period, it relaxed those conditions somewhat in the sectors it promoted for 
export such as cars, electronics, and steel.  All three sectors ended up having higher 
labour productivity than either their counterparts in the United States or in Germany.  
However, Japan has kept its other sectors sheltered from the global marketplace.  This 
has created a dual economy as these sectors have failed to develop high productivity 
levels.  In food processing, three times the number of firms than in the United States only 
produce a third of the output.  As well, the employment in food processing is so large that 
its productivity gap more than negates Japan’s labour productivity advantages in its 
export sectors, placing Japan behind the United States in overall manufacturing labour 
productivity.  Barriers to trade have also hindered productivity in the German beer 
industry, where protection has allowed small, craft-based breweries to survive without 
having to consolidate to achieve economies of scale like the large breweries in the United 
States.  The study makes no adjustments for quality, however. 
 
Still, the Dutch food processing industry is heavily protected yet sets the world 
productivity benchmark in output per hour for the dairy industry.  The Netherlands 
concentrates on bulk dairy production for export, and as such has been able to achieve 
efficiency through scale.  This is in turn heavily supported by EU import tariffs and 
export subsidies, making effective dairy prices in the Netherlands four times the world 
market price.  The same does not hold for Dutch meat processing, however, which is 
similarly protected but fragmented and so, unlike the consolidated dairy industry, has 
been unable to attain efficient scale.  In this respect, the Dutch dairy industry has been 
similar to Japan’s industrial export sectors that have been protected but only truly 
prospered through mass production and scale.  However, the strong productivity 
performance of the Dutch dairy industry may not be sustainable.  Increasing competition 
from other bulk dairy producing countries such as Poland and New Zealand will force the 
Dutch industry to focus on more specialized dairy products.  Unlike bulk dairy, the 
Netherlands may not be able to achieve optimal scale in the production of these premium 
dairy products. 
 
The more common case is Sweden, which has traditionally sheltered a full 75 per 
cent of its economy (mostly service industries) and trailed both the United States and 
Western Europe badly in terms of labour productivity levels throughout the 1980s and 
1990s.  By contrast, Sweden’s openly traded manufacturing sectors, such as the heavy 
truck production of Volvo and Scania, have achieved global best-practice standards 
through competition.  There are few exceptions to the rule that an exposed sector is a 
more productive one. 
   5 
C. Deregulation 
 
  Deregulation has been primarily an American phenomenon.  The most commonly 
cited example has been the U.S. airline industry, which was deregulated in the late 1970s 
and engaged in price wars through the 1980s that created such intense competition that 
the hub-and-spoke system developed.  By establishing hub airports that had scheduled 
waves of flights coming in and going out at certain periods during the day, the major U.S. 
airlines were able to offer consumers more frequent flights at low cost.  Europe has begun 
the process of deregulation more recently, but as most countries had state-run monopolies 
or duopolies in the 1980s, Europe’s average level of labour productivity in the airline 
industry in 1989 was only about 72 per cent that of the United States. 
 
  In contrast to this low level of labour productivity in the airline industry in Europe 
relative to the United States, U.S. and European carriers appear to have had more equal 
capital productivity levels in terms of flight loads.  On the ground, however, the legacy of 
state-ownership and union rules has persisted through overstaffing in Europe, while 
American maintenance and sales tend to be more streamlined since deregulation has 
allowed for reorganization.  The larger size of the U.S. network and airlines has also 
created better economies of scale in maintenance.   
 
The U.S. inter-city domestic airline market has always been impenetrable to 
European competitors.  Deregulation did not immediately create an environment of 
intense competition in the United States, but the long-run impact on competition has been 
undeniable.  Thus, as European countries seek to close their productivity gaps with the 
United States through deregulation, a complete opening of their markets to American 
competition may make the transition quicker than it was in the United States. 
 
  The same has been true in telecommunications, where the United States and Japan 
deregulated in the 1980s while Germany waited until the late 1990s.  
Telecommunications has always been a capital-intensive industry with large fixed 
networks and high infrastructure costs, so in some respects it has always lent itself to 
natural monopolies in local markets (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation 
(NTT) in Japan and the regional Bells in the United States).  Deregulation has served to 
open up the long-distance calling markets to competition, however, and wireless telecom 
has followed the same pattern in recent years.  Labour productivity levels have 
traditionally been nearly equivalent in all three countries; Germany fell behind slightly as 
the United States and Japan gradually reduced their labour inputs since technological 
innovation and network restructuring have been easier after deregulation.  The key 
difference is that the United States has dominated Japan and Germany in capital 
productivity because of higher demand for calling and thus greater use of the network.  
This has primarily been a marketing issue that will be discussed later, but it has only been 
possible through deregulation.  The story for electrical utilities is almost identical.  
 
  Banking is another textbook industry for the potential advantages of deregulation.  
When the Swedish banking sector deregulated in the 1980s, it quickly transformed itself 
from a non-competitive oligopolistic structure that did little to encourage personal saving   6 
into a profit-driven industry that competed on interest rates and began to offer a wider 
range of mortgage and security services.  Customers became more sophisticated in their 
banking preferences and as the demand for financial services increased, Swedish banks 
began to reorganize and become more efficient to keep pace.  By 1992, Sweden had 
passed Germany and the United Kingdom in total factor productivity in banking and 
trailed only the United States, according to the MGI (1995) study.   
 
D. Minimum wage 
 
On the side of indirect anti-competitive regulations, one of the most obvious 
social and economic distinctions between the United States and European labour markets 
is the difference in their respective minimum wages.  Other than the United Kingdom, 
which instituted a minimum wage in 1999 roughly in line with the U.S. minimum wage 
in absolute terms, the average minimum wage in Europe is significantly higher than in 
the United States.  And as the lowest wages tend to go to the lowest-skill positions, a 
higher minimum wage naturally affects employment and productivity figures in low-skill 
sectors, most particularly general merchandising retail. 
 
The net effect of higher minimum wages in the retail sector is that the lowest-skill 
positions, such as grocery baggers in supermarkets, are phased out because their cost 
outweighs the average consumer’s willingness to pay for their services.  The labour 
productivity associated with these jobs is low, and so while employment may fall with 
their elimination, aggregate labour productivity is higher through a composition effect.  
From a measurement standpoint, this creates a comparison problem between the United 
States and countries like France, Sweden, and Germany.  MGI measure retail labour 
productivity as sales divided by total workers, and these low-skill positions add to the 
number of workers but do not add to the number of sales to as large a degree as higher-
skill jobs.  European productivity is thus higher relative to the United States than would 
be the case if there were the same proportion of low-skill jobs in each country, since the 
same number of sales is associated with higher employment in the United States than in 
Europe. 
 
The 1997 McKinsey study of the Netherlands has been the only attempt to correct 
for this effect by comparing the absolute productivity levels of large multinational chains 
like Home Depot and IKEA versus their relative employment levels.  The assumption 
made is that because of their similar global formats and standardized training, these large 
chains generate the same level of service and efficiency regardless of country (assuming 
also that labour skills are equal in each country, which is reasonable for low-skill retail 
positions).  If absolute productivity is taken as a constant but one country, usually the 
United States, employs more workers in each chain, those additional workers are 
assumed to be providing extra retail service.  So where traditional productivity figures 
place the United States no more than 5 per cent ahead of the Netherlands in retail 
productivity, adding the greater service level in the United States to U.S. output and 
hence productivity increases that figure to almost 20 per cent.  However, Baily and 
Zitzewitz (2001) point out that this effect is slightly overstated by assuming each 
additional worker provides the same increase in services.   7 
 
In the Netherlands, the biggest problem with the minimum wage is not necessarily 
the wage level itself but its relationship to unemployment benefits.  Unemployment 
benefits in the Netherlands are, on average, 78 per cent of the minimum wage, while the 
rest of Europe averages 64 per cent and only Denmark has a higher ratio than the 
Netherlands.  This provides little incentive for low-skill workers to find employment.  At 
the same time, social security taxes represent 32 per cent of the cost of hiring a worker at 
a minimum-wage salary, versus a 25 per cent average in Europe and surpassed only by 
Italy, Greece, and Belgium.  There is thus also little incentive for employers to hire low-
skill workers.  It is estimated that a full 9 per cent of the Dutch population is on some 
form of social or disability assistance and not counted in unemployment statistics.  This 
helps explain why the United States has over 20 per cent more employment in similar 
retail operations, although it is also important to note that the minimum wage in the 
United States is barely half what it is in the Netherlands (in 1995, about $5.10 U.S. versus 
$9.60 U.S.), and that a full 35 per cent of the U.S. retail sector works for less than the 
Dutch minimum wage.   
 
The same holds true for France and Germany.  MGI’s 2002 study of their total 
economy productivity gap with the United States showed France to be 4 per cent ahead of 
the United States and Germany 6 per cent behind the United States (with all three being 
about equal in retail).  These estimates are based on unadjusted labour productivity, i.e. 
simply GDP (converted to U.S. dollars by way of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)) 
divided by total hours worked.  But after making an adjustment to account for the effect 
of minimum wages on the composition of employment (over 10 per cent of the U.S. 
workforce is employed below the minimum wage in either France or Germany
2), the 
level of labour productivity in each country relative to that in the United States falls back 
by seven percentage points.
3  The impact is felt mostly in the retail sector, which tends to 
comprise about 5 per cent of GDP and 10 per cent of employment in both the United 
States and Europe. 
 
In 1995, the minimum wage in France and Germany (converted to U.S. dollars at 
PPP) was about double that in the United States.  This is the primary reason why a branch 
of a retail firm in the United States may have 50 per cent more employees than its 
European counterpart.  The actual productivity levels between those branches are not 
necessarily different: employees at a U.S. IKEA store are no more or less productive and 
efficient than those at a French IKEA outlet.  Because an American branch can afford to 
hire more employees, however, the differences between the two countries manifest 
themselves in service levels like longer opening hours and more checkout lines.  When 
this higher level of services is accounted for – and retail services, while not physical 
output, are consciously consumed just as retail goods are – any European advantage in 
                                                 
2 Germany has no official minimum wage, as minimum provisions are usually determined through 
collective bargaining by sector and location.  However, an effective minimum wage can be calculated by 
considering the average minimum provisions of these collective contracts. 
3 It is not clear precisely how this adjustment is made, but it presumably involves boosting U.S. output and 
hence labour productivity by some proportion related to the number of U.S. workers employed below the 
minimum wage in France or Germany.  The full effect of seven percentage points also includes a one to 
two percentage point effect of comparing at the business sector level rather than the total economy level.   8 
productivity statistics from having fewer employees disappears.  MGI’s intention is to 
combine traditional output productivity with the more nebulous concept of productivity 
adjusted for service levels. 
 
The existence and level of a minimum wage is a social issue within each country 
and outside the scope of this review.  But as the McKinsey Global Institute has frequently 
argued, the effect of a minimum wage on increasing low-skilled labour unemployment at 
least negates the effect of increasing the living standards of those that manage to find or 
keep jobs.  MGI have often recommended a lower minimum wage in most European 
countries, combined with an earned income tax credit or negative income tax for low-
wage workers that is designed to have the same effect. 
 
E. Work Rules 
 
There are other factors that can make a country’s labour markets relatively 
inflexible, such as high levels of unionization and stringent work rules.  The United 
States and United Kingdom are far ahead of the rest of Europe by most flexibility 
measures such as less stringent hiring and firing requirements.  The existence of a lower 
minimum wage is partly responsible for these effects, but at the same time, the United 
States and the United Kingdom rely much more heavily on part-time labour, have fewer 
long-term contracts and have less centralized collective bargaining than continental 
Europe. 
 
There are some advantages to less flexible labour markets.  Long-term 
employment contracts, while sometimes impeding the productivity-enhancing 
redeployment of workers from low- to high-productivity jobs, can also allow for a greater 
degree of specialized training, as is the case in the German automotive sector.  Rapid 
turnover, part-time employment, and low wages in the United States, the United 
Kingdom and Japan make such training difficult, but at the same time, that flexibility 
allows for greater innovation and development in service sectors and a lower overall level 
of unemployment.  It also allows for the American and Japanese electronics industries to 
better adjust for seasonal demand fluctuations, particularly in December.  And the same 
inflexibility that allows for specialized training in German auto manufacturing also 
caused Germany to fall well behind in productivity during the 1990s since management 
was unable to restructure the workforce to adopt global best-practice organization 
techniques as they were developed by Japan and the United States. 
 
In their 1992 study of service sectors across countries, MGI concluded that unions 
and labour rules played a role in reducing labour productivity levels in low-competition 
industries like airlines and telecom, but were less of a factor in high-competition 
industries.  The 1993 MGI study of manufacturing between Japan, the United States, and 
Germany echoed this conclusion.  Metalworking, steel, and automotive production have 
always experienced about the same level of unionization in the United States as in 
Germany, but exposure to global competition, usually from Japan, eventually forced the 
United States to modify its work rules to remain productive.  No such pressure existed in 
Germany because of industry sheltering, and so work rules there are still restrictive.   9 
 
In Sweden, to take another example, both the automotive and construction 
industries have been affected by strict union rules.  Sweden was relatively open to trade 
during the 1980s but only felt global competitive pressure once Japanese brands like 
Lexus began competing in the luxury car market with Saab and Volvo.  Strict work rules 
then began to hinder the ability of these Swedish firms to adopt best practice, and a 
productivity gap emerged.  As Sweden’s unions are organized along craft lines, not sector 
lines, the relaxation of rules governing what tasks workers were allowed to perform was 
almost impossible.  Growing international competitive pressure and the recession from 
1990 to 1993 eventually forced the unions to relax their layoff and task-distribution 
conditions, which allowed the Swedish auto manufacturers to restructure their production 
processes.  Similarly, having a union for nearly every major building task made 
construction highly disintegrated and costly compared to the much more streamlined 
process in the United States.  Another observation on Swedish work rules is that their 
effect is most often felt in small and medium-sized companies that may be less willing to 
absorb the legal and financial settlement costs of laying off employees and so restrict 
their hiring in the first place. 
 
Perhaps ironically, work rules did not hinder Sweden in becoming the global 
leader in public transport productivity.  In comparing bus and train systems between 
European countries (the United States is much larger and uses public transport to a much 
lesser degree, so could not be included in the analysis on a comparable basis), Sweden 
and in particular Stockholm was easily the most productive by virtue of its efficient use 
of labour.  Almost 60 per cent of paid driver hours in Sweden are spent driving, 
compared to only 35 per cent in the Netherlands, for example.  This difference is due to 
less restrictive work rules in Sweden.  As costs for similar levels of service are thus 
lower, the Swedish transit system has been able to expand more.  As more people use the 
larger system and traffic congestion decreases, buses are able to travel faster and provide 
even more service, thus achieving benefits from scale. 
 
Sweden and the Netherlands have similar public transport unions whose members 
receive similar benefits, but the difference is that Sweden’s unions agreed to accept less 
stringent work rules, which allowed the industry to improve productivity, in exchange for 
higher pay and performance incentives.  So while drivers in both countries may have 
similar aggregate break times, for example, the timing of these breaks has been made 
more flexible in Sweden than in the Netherlands, allowing longer periods of continuous 
driving time and thus more service.  At the same time, Swedish municipalities own the 
rolling capital stock for bus service and decide on the level of route provision, but allow 
private services to bid on three-to-five-year contracts for portions of the network.  As this 
has opened the system to competition, it has also put more of an emphasis on 
productivity.  As Baily and Zitzewitz (2001) point out, Sweden saw a 45 per cent gain in 
productivity in public transport due to competition over the 1980-1995 period, and a 
similar system in the United Kingdom increased transport productivity by 71 per cent 
over the same period.  Japan has also moved toward such a competitive environment. 
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In the MGI (1997b) report on the Netherlands it was found that the Dutch have 
the strictest layoff conditions in Europe.  Extremely short temporary labour contracts and 
lengthy layoff notification periods impede both turnover and the relaxation of work rules.  
This is not only true in public transit, where lower labour utilization has lead to a 47 per 
cent lower labour productivity level in the Netherlands than in Sweden, but also in the 
retail banking system, which otherwise is among the most productive in the world.  The 
Netherlands may be the only country in the world with both strict union rules and a 
service-sector-oriented economy, however: it restructured away from manufacturing in 
the 1970s and no longer faces the problems France and Germany have in shedding 
manufacturing jobs and creating a larger service sector with better growth potential.  Still, 
in almost every country with relatively inflexible labour it is the recommendation of the 
McKinsey Institute that work rules be relaxed, whether it be German or French 
manufacturing, the Dutch service industry, or Swedish construction.  As the Swedish 
public transport example shows, a simple reworking of union rules combined with the 
familiar recommendation of healthy competition can pay significant dividends in 
productivity growth. 
 
F. Zoning Laws 
 
Zoning laws and other product market restrictions are yet other areas where 
regulation tends to adversely affect European productivity in terms of output with respect 
to the United States.  Land in Europe tends to be comparatively more expensive than in 
the United States and is often parceled in much smaller plots.  This can have spillover 
effects in several sectors.  The inability to find space for a large shopping mall in France, 
Germany, or Sweden, for example, not only affects the retail sector but also the 
construction sector that otherwise would have built it. 
 
Municipalities in France and Germany have little incentive to give up tracts of 
suburban land for large housing developments because revenue from municipal property 
taxes is low (unlike in the United States and Canada) and therefore does not cover the 
costs of the public infrastructure necessary to support such large developments.
4  As a 
result, there is no mass construction of standardized single-family housing, so the 
construction sector cannot achieve economies of scale.  Productivity in this sector is 
consequently significantly lower than in the United States.  This artificial scarcity of land 
keeps prices up and leaves landowners trying to realize speculative profits, with the result 
that land is four times more expensive in Germany and the Netherlands than in the United 
States, and more than twice as expensive in France than in the United States.  The 
Netherlands has a government subsidy program to finance designated “growth” areas in 
an attempt to mitigate this, but the government has still only designated 8 per cent of the 
country’s land for housing versus 70 per cent for agriculture. 
                                                 
4 Presumably there is no mechanism by which French and German municipalities can increase property tax 
rates by enough to raise revenues sufficient to cover these infrastructure costs.  MGI (1997a) reports that 
annual property taxes in the United States are on average two per cent of the value of the house, compared 
to about 0.15 per cent in West Germany.  Further, U.S. municipalities typically charge “impact fees” to 
developers to cover some of these infrastructure costs, while Germany and France have not been able to 
either due to legal or institutional constraints.  11 
 
In France in particular, zoning laws also limit retail innovation.  Modern chains 
end up paying much higher rental fees than traditional and established large-format 
French retailers like hypermarkets and department stores.  As well, high entry fees, in 
terms of cash payments required by law to takeover existing leases, tend to discourage 
foreign chains from entering the French market.  Germany suffers from the same 
problem, not because of its rental system but because of its exorbitant land prices.  The 
Netherlands has even more restrictive retail zoning laws than France does.  All three 
countries’ governments have also mandated restrictive opening, closing, and weekend 
hours in an effort to protect traditional retailers and limit entry.  For all these reasons, 
competitive intensity and hence productivity levels are much lower in these countries 
than in the United States where a general-format retailer like Wal-Mart is allowed to 
expand and stay open longer.  Zoning laws, through limiting expansion, also discourage 
the hiring of low-skill labour much like the minimum wage does.  Though capacity 
utilization and productivity may appear higher as a result, these firms lack the business 
innovation American chains must develop because of competitive pressure. 
 
The same is true even in the United Kingdom, which has deregulated labour and 
capital markets like the United States but still has restrictive land use regulations.  
Although municipalities have more revenue-raising ability through property taxation in 
the United Kingdom, the complex, time-consuming nature of local planning has limited 
retail expansion just as much as in France or Germany.  In the United Kingdom, many 
inefficient traditional retailers, particularly supermarkets, have been able to stay in 
business because restrictions on the size of locations have prevented the strongest 
retailers from achieving economies of scale, and competitive intensity has hence suffered.  
The United Kingdom thus ends up somewhere between the United States and continental 
Europe in terms of retail productivity: its retailers can provide a fuller range of services 
as in the United States because of the low minimum wage; but they are also restricted 
from expanding, as is the case in France, Germany, and the Netherlands.  In each case the 
McKinsey Global Institute favours the relaxation of these zoning laws.  As is pointed out 
in MGI (1995), Sweden moved in this direction in retail during the 1990s and saw 
productivity gains as a result. 
 
II. Managerial Factors 
 
  Perhaps even more important than the market conditions under which a firm 
operates is the way its managers choose to react to those conditions.  Competitiveness is 
the main driver of managerial innovation, but managerial innovation (or lack thereof) is 
what affects productivity, first at the firm level, then the industry level, and ultimately at 
the national level.  American managers are typically able to pursue profits more freely 
than European managers, who are perhaps forced to achieve social goals above profits to 
a greater extent than in the United States.  This could be due to a combination of different 
demands of shareholders across countries, different regulatory frameworks within which 
companies operate, and different levels of competitive intensity.  It should also be 
mentioned that, while social objectives may hamper the productivity of firms to some 
degree, they have a positive effect on well-being.  In any case, most of the productivity  12 
differences between the United States and Western Europe are related to this distinction 
in one way or another.  This section examines the concept of global best practice, looks at 
potential differences in labour skill between countries, and analyzes the effects of 
marketing on productivity.  It also deals with the newer challenge of IT (information 
technology) investment and its effect on capital intensity.  
 
A. Adopting Best Practice 
 
  The key reason the McKinsey Global Institute advocates having competitive, 
exposed sectors is because of the concept of “best practice.”  Theoretically, if a 
production process takes place in several different countries, one of those countries (or at 
least one firm within the country) will develop the best, most efficient method of 
production.  As that firm becomes more productive and other firms within the country 
follow its example, the country itself will gain a productivity advantage over other 
countries within that sector.  The easiest way for other countries to catch up is to change 
their production processes as well, but some may be unwilling or unable to do this.  If a 
firm faces little competition within its own borders, it may have little incentive to 
undertake the initial costs necessary to improve productivity through the adoption of best 
practice unless its profits depend on it.  Similarly, a domestic sector protected by barriers 
to foreign competition is not considered “exposed” to best practices and need not worry 
about keeping pace with foreign rivals.  Competition is therefore the driver of this crucial 
aspect of managerial behaviour: managers in competitive sectors must adopt best practice 
or fail, while managers in non-competitive sectors need not worry about changing their 
original processes. 
 
  The quickest way that a country can become exposed to global best practice is 
through foreign direct investment, or in other words through transplant operations such as 
Japanese automotive plants in the United States.  This is often considered a more 
palatable option than trade since it directly increases productivity within the transplant 
country and does not displace workers as trade does.  Transplant operations are still far 
more common in the United States, the most “exposed” country in the world, than in 
Japan or Europe.  This is due to mostly deregulated sectors and relatively easy entry into 
the market for corporate control in the United States.  Through transplant operations as 
well as openness to trade, the United States has adopted the best practice of other 
countries to a much greater degree than any country in the world. 
 
  In electronics, for example, Japan became the world leader in the 1970s and 
1980s when its previously protected industries became exposed to international 
competition, and the United States and Germany were forced to catch up.  Since the 
United States was open to trade and to Japanese transplant operations, it developed best-
practice processes fairly quickly and ended up scaling its industry back to high-end 
consumer electronics and outsourcing the production of most other electronic goods.  
While there were frictional problems in the short-run, this specialization has helped the 
United States in the long-term.  German electronics, on the other hand, remained a 
protected sector.  This was less of a problem since the German market primarily 
remained closed to Japanese imports, but once Japanese electronics and software  13 
companies began setting up transplant operations in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, 
Germany began to face direct competition and found itself lagging badly. 
 
  Dispersion of best practice can also be an entirely domestic phenomenon, as Wal-
Mart has proven in the U.S. retail sector.  Wal-Mart became the largest retailer in the 
United States through a combination of scale, supply chain efficiency, and basic 
technological innovations like electronic tracking and scanning.  And while Wal-Mart’s 
growth has pushed several firms out of the retail market, it has also forced other 
competitors like Target to adopt many of the same techniques to remain profitable, thus 
reshaping the formats and services offered by most firms within the sector.  Most notably, 
however, is that despite the growth of Wal-Mart’s operation, a full two-thirds of the 
improvement in retail labour productivity from adopting new practices in the United 
States between 1995 and 2000 is attributable not to Wal-Mart, but to competitors in retail 
following Wal-Mart’s example (MGI, 2001). 
 
  Most of the barriers to the adoption of global best practice have already been 
outlined.  Anything that creates a barrier to competition will also create a barrier to 
adopting best practice.  It is therefore almost always the recommendation of the 
McKinsey Global Institute that governments find an equitable way to introduce 
competition, since productivity increases invariably follow. 
 
B. Human Capital and Labour Skill 
 
  Perhaps the most important reason for concentrating on managerial behaviour is 
the fact that MGI finds little reason to believe that skills of production workers differ 
greatly between countries.  Productivity differences originate in the boardroom, not the 
shop floor.  Higher labour productivity levels in the manufacturing industry in Japan and 
Germany than in the United States in the 1980s were not driven by some German or 
Japanese work ethic instilled in production workers, as was frequently bemoaned in the 
United States at this time.  Rather, they were driven by more efficient production 
processes in Germany and Japan in the automobile industry.  Similar processes have 
since been adopted by the United States, where workers appear to be just as capable at 
implementing them. 
 
  The most in-depth MGI study in this area is the 1993 manufacturing report (MGI, 
1993), especially with regard to American automotive production versus Japanese 
automotive production.  What differences exist between workers in each country is not a 
result of intrinsic skills but of training, which is the responsibility of management.  
Japanese transplant factories in the United States, using American labour, were able to 
achieve similar productivity levels to initially superior Japanese plants, as were domestic 
U.S. plants once they were exposed to Japanese practices. 
 
  Where there can be significant human capital differences, then, is on the 
managerial side.  In the Netherlands, for example, the McKinsey Global Institute (1997b) 
attributed the slow growth of the software sector to a lack of entrepreneurship and poor 
university business training.  In this country there are few high-tech specialists, few  14 
connections between universities and high-tech businesses as in the United States, and 
thus few reasons for venture capitalists to invest heavily in the sector.  There may also be 
greater discouragement to potential entrepreneurs through stricter bankruptcy procedures 
than in the United States.  But whether or not there is more intrinsic entrepreneurship in 
the United States than in other countries (and this is highly debatable), developing 




  One area of managerial behaviour that becomes much more important in a 
competitive environment is marketing.  There is perhaps no greater example of the 
impact of marketing on productivity than in the telecommunications sector, where the 
United States is more productive than Europe.  Telecommunications requires a large 
network of fixed capital.  While labour productivity in the telecommunications sector has 
traditionally been similar in the United States, France, and Germany, the same has not 
been true for capital productivity.  Capital productivity in telecommunications in the 
United States is higher than in France and Germany because the fixed network in the 
United States is used much more heavily than in Europe.  With broadly similar labour 
productivity performance, the higher U.S. capital productivity means that total factor 
productivity is also higher in the United States than in France or Germany. 
 
  The more intensive use of the fixed network in the United States is almost entirely 
the result of aggressive marketing on the part of American phone companies.  In the 
United States, emphasis on flat-rate long-distance plans, toll-free numbers, and services 
such as call waiting and voicemail have made call volume per capita more than double 
any European nation.  This is partly a reflection of the size and population dispersion of 
the United States, particularly where long-distance calling is concerned; but even so, 
telephone usage has never been encouraged on such a scale in France or Germany.  It was 
even the policy of Deutsche Telekom for a while to tell consumers to keep their calls 
short, which practically amounts to anti-marketing. 
   
  Marketing is the same as IT expenditure, in that companies have little incentive to 
pursue it unless they face intense competition, in which case it may become a necessity to 
stay productive.  As a result, heavy marketing in Europe has generally occurred after a 
sector has been deregulated, as was the case with Swedish banking. 
 
D. IT And Productivity Growth 
 
  The story of the U.S. economy in the second half of the 1990s is one of 
tremendous labour productivity growth.  Labour productivity in the U.S. non-farm 
business sector grew by 2.5 per cent per year in 1995-2000 despite only growing 1.4 per 
cent per year in 1972-1995.  Over the same period, IT (information technology) 
investment nearly doubled, and it has often been posited that this heavy investment was 
the primary driver behind labour productivity growth.  According to MGI, this is not 
entirely true: the U.S. labour productivity growth acceleration was driven mainly by six 
“jumping” sectors (semiconductors, computers, telecommunications, retail, wholesale,  15 
and securities), and IT only played a crucial role in a few of these sectors.  Most of the 
time, productivity was driven by a factor that was only partially related to IT, such as 
intense competition in the case of retail (Wal-Mart) and semiconductors (Intel, AMD), 
device innovations outside the computer manufacturing sector itself, or low-tech 
warehouse automation as in the wholesaling industry.  As well, much IT investment 
between 1995 and 1999 was due to unique factors, such as Y2K preparedness, which are 
not expected to be related to productivity growth. 
 
  That being said, few would dispute that IT investment plays an important role in 
productivity growth.  Although the application of IT may not have been as large a factor 
in the productivity growth acceleration as it has been thought in the past, the production 
of IT in the form of computers and semiconductors certainly was an important factor, as 
these two sectors alone accounted for 22 per cent of the United States’ productivity 
growth acceleration between 1987-1995 and 1995-1999 (MGI, 2001).  IT is different 
from regular capital investment in that, under certain circumstances, it can have a far 
greater effect in terms of magnifying labour productivity growth than traditional capital 
like machinery and tools.  But it requires appropriateness in its application, as will later 
be discussed. 
 
  In France and Germany, IT manufacturing as a proportion of total GDP is 60 per 
cent that in the United States.  According to MGI (2002), this explains a full third of the 
difference between labour productivity growth in the United States and that in France and 
Germany in 1995-2000.  But the lower level of IT spending in France and Germany 
relative to that in the United States does not explain much of the remaining two thirds of 
the difference in productivity growth.  In terms of investment, IT has had about the same 
level of effectiveness in Europe as in the United States with many of the same caveats 
about applicability.  Remaining differences in productivity growth can best be explained 
by the plethora of regulatory factors already discussed. 
 
E. Capital Intensity 
 
  Capital intensity is the amount of capital per worker within a sector.  Increased 
capital intensity does not necessarily translate into increased labour productivity because 
capital may still be used more efficiently or less efficiently by workers within different 
countries. In German manufacturing, for example, capital intensity has always been 
greater than in the United States since labour tends to be less flexible and more costly, so 
that capital is substituted for labour to a higher degree.  At the same time, however, that 
capital is not used efficiently, so capital and hence labour productivity are lower.  As 
pointed out in MGI (1996a), it is often the case that capital is used efficiently or 
inefficiently regardless of the level of investment, suggesting that the issue is a 
managerial one. 
 
  Low capital intensity was the key area for improvement outlined in the MGI study 
of the United Kingdom (MGI, 1998).  In both manufacturing and service sectors, the 
United Kingdom’s capital intensity is about 20 per cent lower than in the United States 
and 30 per cent lower than in either France or Germany.  To a certain extent this explains  16 
the United Kingdom’s low level of labour productivity relative to the United States, 
France, and Germany.  Labour is much cheaper in the United Kingdom than in France or 
Germany, and so labour has been substituted for capital in a reverse of the situation in 
Germany.  With more low-skill workers and less capital for each to use, labour 
productivity is lower.  However, this does not entirely explain the discrepancy in total 
factor productivity with these other countries because capital productivity in the United 
Kingdom is also low, again suggesting that efficient use is independent of the level of 
investment. 
 
  Most of the barriers to investment in the United Kingdom are in product markets, 
such as land use regulations that make it too costly to upgrade hundred-year-old hotels.  
There is also a lack of venture capital as there is in the Netherlands.  The effects of this 
low capital intensity are widespread, however, and perhaps most noticeable in health 
care.  In MGI (1996b) – a disease-by-disease study of health care productivity in the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany – the United Kingdom trailed the 
United States in breast cancer, lung cancer, and gallstones treatment because of these 
constraints on capital investment and thus the slower adoption of IT treatment methods.  
Part of this is related to the regulatory environment in each country and the differing 
levels of competitiveness; the United States has insurance provider competition, HMOs, 
and service-based doctor’s fees, while the health care system in the United Kingdom is 
centralized within the National Health Service and doctors are on fixed salaries.  As a 
result, in some cases there is less incentive for innovative treatment and the quick 
adoption of new technology.  It is worth noting that for some treatments the United 
Kingdom is actually more productive than the United States because of the NHS’s ability 
to better integrate specialized care than in a competition-based insurance system.  As a 
sector, health care is far too complex to simply prescribe a free-market system, but some 
of the United Kingdom’s slow IT investment can be attributed to its government control. 
 
  In the United States, on the other hand, rapid IT adoption means that capital 
intensity has grown in nearly every sector since 1995.  As we have seen, however, this 
has not resulted in productivity growth in every case.  Capital intensity is often a 
necessary but not always sufficient condition for productivity. 
 
F. IT Investment’s Real Effectiveness 
 
  The main conclusion of MGI (2001) is that there is an unclear relationship 
between IT investment and productivity growth.  Other than the six “jumping” sectors, 
the remaining 69 per cent of the U.S. economy accounted for only 1 per cent of the 
productivity growth acceleration, yet accounted for 62 per cent of the acceleration in IT 
intensity growth (Table 1).  In particular, hotels, retail banking, and long-distance data 
transmission saw almost no productivity growth despite heavy IT investment, and some 
of the sectors that did grow, like retail, owe far more to basic managerial innovation than 
to technological development.  In fact, the only two industries where IT investment 
undisputedly increased labour productivity were securities and telecom. 
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  The key to IT investment is “vertical” investment, or industry-specific investment 
that affects the core production process within the industry.  Online trading in the 
securities industry is a perfect example, because it all but eliminates the more labour-
intensive traditional methods.  In contrast, there are other examples where IT investment 
has not been timed well, in terms of being poorly coordinated with consumer preferences 
or too focused on uncertain future gains.  Online banking systems in the United States did 
not lead to immediate productivity gains in the U.S. banking sector because U.S. 
consumers have been slow to adopt electronic banking.  In addition, some of the IT 
investment in retail banking and most of the IT investment in the hotel industry was 
devoted to collecting extensive customer information that to this point has been 
underused.  In most other cases, IT investment merely redesigns the product or service 
being offered without actually impacting the core production process. 
 
Table 1: Sector Contributions to Labour Productivity and IT Capital Intensity 
Growth Acceleration in the United States 
 
Labour Productivity Growth 
Acceleration, 1987-1995 to 1995-
1999 
IT Capital Intensity Growth 



























100  99  1  100  38  62 
Source: data taken from MGI (2001).  Business sector labour productivity, as calculated 
by MGI, grew by 0.99 per cent per year in 1987-1995 and by 2.32 per cent per year in 
1995-1999, an acceleration of 1.33 percentage points.  Business sector IT capital 
intensity, as calculated by MGI, grew by 6.0 per cent per year in 1987-1995 and by 13.9 
per cent per year in 1995-1999, an acceleration of 7.9 percentage points. 
 
  The 2002 McKinsey report on productivity growth in France and Germany 
outlined how IT investment is most useful in industries where it aids in the leveraging of 
scale, particularly in highly-concentrated industries.  In fragmented industries (retail 
banking is again an example), IT investment is usually not standardized enough to 
become efficient on a sector-wide basis.  Even when IT investment takes place in 
consolidated industries, however, it must be focused on immediate productivity gains and 
combined with managerial innovation to be effective in improving productivity. 
 
III. Demand Factors 
 
  After establishing market conditions and ascertaining how managers will react to 
them, the final link in the chain is of course how consumers will respond to the behaviour  18 
of the firm.  If a competitive market forces a firm to innovate in order to create better 
goods and services at lower prices (and costs), then there should be an increase in 
demand for those improved products, which should more than justify the initial costs of 
innovation and increase firm profits.  As the rest of the industry reacts to this leader firm 
– Wal-Mart, for example – the industry becomes even more competitive and the cycle of 
innovation and productivity begins again. 
 
  That said, there are still independent demand factors that affect how consumers 
will behave toward firms, and in most cases entire sectors must adjust their practices 
accordingly.  Briefly, income levels, cyclical demand factors, and general consumer 




  One influence on consumer behaviour is the average disposable income level.  As 
income increases, consumers tend to shift their focus away from necessities and 
concentrate more expensive goods, services (particularly in retail), and convenience in 
general.  In retail, for example, as incomes rise the demand for luxury goods increases.  
As these goods tend to have large margins while their sale is associated with the same 
labour input as other goods, productivity in terms of current dollar value added per hour 
also rises.  Despite concerns in the United States that the success of such chains as Wal-
Mart, Costco, and Target signified a demand shift toward mass-produced, low-value-
added goods where cheap prices were the most important factor, according to MGI 
(2001), substitution toward high-value goods in fact represented nearly half of the large 
jump in productivity growth in retail between 1987-1995 and 1995-2000.
5 
 
In the restaurant industry, MGI (1992) put the United States ahead of both France 
and Germany in terms of labour productivity levels, in part because of its enormous fast 
food sector with quick, standardized production and low prices.  Average incomes in the 
United States are higher than in Western Europe, and although it may seem counter-
intuitive, as incomes rise fast food consumption tends to increase.  This is primarily 
because part of the trade-off for higher incomes in the United States is more hours 
worked per week, and so fast food consumption mostly represents convenience in terms 
of time.  The high demand for fast food encourages locations to develop standardized 
production processes, which leads to high productivity levels.  Given this high 
productivity and the fact that fast food outlets comprise almost half of the restaurant 
sector in the United States (as opposed to less than 10 per cent in both France and 
Germany), the U.S. restaurant sector as a whole is more productive than that in European 
countries.  This is true even without making an adjustment for the fact that lower wages 
                                                 
5 An increase in the average price of a firm’s output, even though it directly increases current dollar value 
added per hour, does not necessarily result in productivity growth in terms of an increase in real (physical) 
value added per hour, since the price increase could be due only to general inflation.  However, MGI 
(2001) studies the increase in the average price per unit sold by general merchandisers in the United States  
in 1987-1999 that was due to the substitution away from low-priced goods and toward higher-priced goods 
within several commodity categories.  Such substitution is not linked to general inflation and does result in 
growth in real value added.  19 
in the United States allow U.S. restaurants to provide more services that European 
restaurants. 
   
  To the extent that average income can affect productivity through consumer 
behaviour, however, average income is in turn determined by productivity.  It is therefore 
difficult to treat income growth as an independent policy instrument, as it is typically 
productivity that is looked to in improving average income. 
 
B. Structural vs. Cyclical Demand 
 
  One of the issues examined in the MGI (2001) report on U.S. productivity growth 
was how much of the productivity growth acceleration after 1995 was structural (i.e. 
permanent) and how much was simply based on cyclical demand factors that would 
eventually lapse.  As we have already seen, for example, the late 1990s stock market 
boom was a temporary phenomenon, and half of the productivity growth in the securities 
sector ended up being unsustainable.  Most of the remaining growth in other sectors, 
however, such as through Wal-Mart’s managerial practices or wireless upgrading in 
telecom, could best be characterized as structural.  This suggests that the growth rate of 
labour productivity in 1995-1999 will be mostly sustainable in the future, even in the face 
of a temporary recession.  There will still be cyclical growth and decline stemming 
mostly from cyclical demand factors, but the source and nature of these factors are 
difficult to predict.  One likely possibility is that growth in demand for personal 
computers (and thus for semiconductors) will eventually slow as initial adoption becomes 
complete, and that productivity growth in these sectors will be affected by this slower 
demand growth.  In most cases, however, cyclical demand factors only reveal themselves 
after they have run their course. 
 
C. Preferences and Output Mix 
 
  The most obvious example of the influence of consumer preferences is the fact 
that firms within a sector usually vary their output mix, or the variety and quality of their 
products.  This can affect productivity because certain countries or regions may have 
preferences for goods whose production is associated with a higher or lower level of 
productivity.  A third of the German electronics industry, for example, is devoted to 
producing TVs and radios versus only about 10 per cent of the Japanese electronics 
industry, which produces far more VCRs and DVD players.  Since televisions create far 
more value added per hour of work, this skews productivity figures in favour of the 
German electronics industry (at least in this one small way).  The same is true in the 
United States, where 50 per cent of the consumer electronics industry is devoted to 
television production (MGI, 1993).  Furthermore, Japan has always specialized in the 
development of cutting-edge products, which tend to be highly capital-intensive until 
they are produced on a much wider scale. 
 
  There are many other examples.  Germany’s food processing sector has far more 
bakeries per capita than the United States or Japan.  A full quarter of Japan’s food sector 
makes goods that are not produced or consumed in any other country.  German  20 
consumers prefer powder detergent to liquid detergent, which lowers labour productivity 
because of the more labour intensive process required to produce it.  Americans use their 
telephone and utility networks much more heavily than their European counterparts.  
Americans make far more bank transactions per capita.  And as mentioned, the income 
advantage in the United States has shifted its retail sector slightly in the direction of more 
high-value goods.  In many of their studies, MGI considers these factors and attempts to 
adjust productivity figures accordingly. 
 
 
Section Two: Insights on Canada-U.S. Industry Productivity Gaps from 
the MGI Studies 
 
The McKinsey Global Institute has not produced a report on Canadian 
productivity. The objective of this section is to assess whether the findings from the 
McKinsey productivity studies on industry productivity differentials between the United 
States and a number of major developed and developing countries have relevance for the 
explanation of industry productivity differentials between the United States and Canada.  
 
According to a recent Industry Canada study on Canada-U.S. productivity 
relatives by Rao, Tang, and Wang (2004), out of 28 industries in Canada in 1999, 19 had 
labour productivity levels lower than their U.S. counterparts.  These industries, in 
ascending order of the productivity gap (or descending order of the productivity relative) 
were transportation; chemicals; retail trade; other services (repair and maintenance, 
personal and laundry services and religious, civic and professional organizations); 
agriculture; business services; food, beverage and tobacco; utilities; plastic and rubber 
products; furniture and related products; wholesale trade; machinery and computers; 
textiles and clothing; information and cultural industries; electronics and electrical 
equipment; finance, insurance and real estate; miscellaneous manufacturing; fabricated 
metal; and petroleum and coal products. 
 
  In 1999 the level of output per hour in the overall Canadian business sector was 
82 per cent that in the U.S. business sector.  Three of the four major sectors had 
productivity levels below their U.S. counterparts, with the service sector at 79 per cent of 
the U.S. level, the manufacturing sector at 82 per cent, and the primary sector at 84 per 
cent.  In contrast, the Canadian construction industry had a level of output per hour above 
that in the U.S. construction industry, at 120 per cent of the U.S. level.  Chart 1 shows the 
labour productivity relatives in all 28 industries in 1999, with the width of each of the 
columns representing the share of hours worked in the given industry in total business 
sector hours worked.  Although nine of the industries did have productivity relatives 
above one (i.e. productivity levels above those of their U.S. counterparts), Chart 1 makes 
clear that these nine industries represent only a small share of the business sector, namely 
15.3 per cent. 
 
In some respects, the Canadian economy is a bit of a hybrid between the U.S. 
free-market system and the more sheltered, socially-conscious systems of countries like 
France or Sweden.  Canada is more globally-exposed than most EU countries, yet it also      
Chart 1: Industry Levels of Output per Hour in Canada 
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retains a certain level of trade protection and restricts entry to some domestic sectors.  It 
also has a more developed welfare state than the United States in terms of more 
government control of social programs such as health care and pensions.  Canada is more 
unionized than the United States, although the average real minimum wage is about 
equivalent.  This section examines differences between Canada and the United States in 
these and other areas, in the context of the Canada-U.S. industry productivity gaps and 
the factors identified by MGI as playing a large role in determining productivity 
performance. 
 
  As noted earlier in the paper, MGI identifies three sets of factors affecting 
productivity: 
 
·  competitive intensity within a country, both in terms of direct regulation such 
as trade protection and indirect regulations such as minimum wage; 
 
·  the reaction of mangers to competitive conditions and their desire and ability 
to adopt best-practices to improve productivity; and 
 
·  the influence of demand factors on firm and industry behaviour.  
 
I. Competitive Intensity 
 
  It is possible that competition is on average less intense in Canada than in the 
United States, particularly in service-producing industries that are less subject to 
international competition than goods-producing industries and have a smaller market in 
Canada.  The OECD (2004), in its 2004 survey of Canada, provides an in-depth analysis 
of product market competition and find that, out of 21 OECD countries, Canada scored 
11
th according to a composite competition indicator, compared to a 4
th place ranking for 
the United States.
6  The large labour productivity gaps in finance, insurance and real 
estate and in information and cultural industries may hence stem in part from a less 
competitive environment.  Equally, the high productivity levels of natural resource 
industries such as primary metals, wood products, and mining are likely directly related 
to the competitive pressures these industries face to compete on world markets 
 
However, the surprisingly high labour productivity relative (120 per cent of the 
U.S. level) for construction, a sheltered, non-traded industry, does not fit the pattern, 
unless the domestic competitive intensity of the sector is greater in Canada than in the 
United States.  This may in fact be the case.  OECD (2004:Figure 2.4) examines average 
mark-ups to infer the level of concentration in a given industry and hence to proxy the 
level of competitive intensity.  The Canadian construction industry had the lowest mark-
ups on average over the past two decades across 10 OECD countries, while the U.S. 
construction industry was in 7
th place.  This suggests that the Canadian construction 
                                                 
6 Details on this composite indicator can be found in Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) and OECD (2004).  The 
indicator increases (and product market competition decreases) with increases in, for example, barriers to 
entry, price controls, public ownership, barriers to competition, and limits on foreign ownership.  23 
industry, to a much larger degree than the U.S. industry, is characterized by a number of 
small firms that compete vigorously with one another and hence must achieve a high 
level of productivity to survive. 
 
American anti-trust law appears more aggressive in challenging large 
concentrations of corporate power (e.g. AT&T, Microsoft) than Canadian competition 
policy.  OECD (2004) quotes Ross (2004) in stating that the Canadian Competition Act 
still faces some challenges in providing Canada with a fully effective anti-trust regime.  
Some suggestions for improvement include authorizing monetary penalties for certain 
civil violations, and permitting the ready prosecution of cartels while allowing for more 
refined examination of other economic conduct. 
 
However, OECD (2004) sees barriers to foreign direct investment as Canada’s 
largest weakness in terms of product market competition.  The composite 
competitiveness indicator mentioned above is based on three underlying dimensions, 
namely economic regulation, administrative regulation, and barriers to trade and 
investment.  Canada actually compares favourable to the United States on the first two of 
these dimensions; but when it comes to restrictions on foreign direct investment in 1998-
2000, Canada was in 27
th place out of 28 OECD countries. 
 
Restrictions on foreign ownership and control in certain industries such as the 
cultural industries (e.g. book retailing, newspapers) and banking may reduce competitive 
pressures, particularly in situations where domestic competition is not intense. Indeed, as 
noted above, there are large labour productivity level gaps in cultural and informational 
industries and FIRE, although more industry disaggregation is needed to ascertain if it is 
the protected industries within these broad industry groupings that are responsible for 
Canada’s lower productivity levels. Business services and retail and wholesale trade are 
industries in which Canada has large labour productivity gaps with the United States and 
that OECD (2003) has identified  as industries that have a high degree of foreign direct 
investment restrictions relative to the United States.
7 
 
Such restrictions may be less harmful to productivity in industries where there is 
robust domestic competition such as air passenger transport. Indeed, Canada’s level of 
labour productivity in transportation is comparable to that in the United States.  OECD 
(2003) shows that restrictions on foreign direct investment in this industry are slightly 




  Unlike many countries studied by MGI, Canadian industries are not heavily 
sheltered from international trade. In addition, trade barriers have fallen greatly in recent 
                                                 
7 It should be noted, however, that foreign direct investment restrictions are found by OECD (2003) to be 
higher in the Canadian construction industry than in the U.S. industry, but as already noted, Canada has a 
large labour productivity advantage over the United States in this industry. 
8 OECD (2003) contains three separate studies on foreign direct investment in OECD countries.  These 
detailed data by country and industry are not available directly from the three studies, but are available 
from the underlying OECD database.  24 
decades. But non-tariff barriers are still important in certain sectors such as agriculture. 
Restrictions on imports in the egg, poultry, and dairy industries administered by 
marketing boards certainly have reduced competitive pressures and may have contributed 
to the relatively low labour productivity level in agriculture. While trade barriers have 
greatly fallen in the context of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
restrictions on some labour intensive goods from other countries remain. The low labour 
productivity levels relative to those in the United States in furniture and related products, 
textiles and clothing, plastic and rubber products, and food, beverage and tobacco may 
reflect the negative impact of these barriers on competition and productivity.  OECD 
(2004) notes as well that some restrictions still remain on inter-provincial trade, which 
could especially by detrimental to productivity in personal service industries (which are 
included in the broad other services category, with a productivity relative of 83 per cent 
of the U.S. level, in Chart 1). 
 
  Canada, following the lead of the United States, has deregulated many sectors of 
the economy in recent years, including air passenger transport, trucking, and much of 
telecommunications. The comparable labour productivity levels between Canada and the 
United States in the transportation industry may reflect this relative lack of regulation 
common to both countries.  Again, greater disaggregation of productivity levels in the 
transportation industry is needed. Outside of agriculture, there are few industries that are 
now much more heavily regulated in Canada than in the United States, in contrast to 
other countries. 
 
One industry that is perhaps more heavily regulated in Canada than in the United 
States, or in any case faces a high degree of regulation, is the electricity generation 
industry.  This industry is included in the utilities industry, with a productivity relative of 
77 per cent of the U.S. level, in Chart 1.  OECD (2004) states that competition in the 
Canadian electricity industry as a whole could be improved if the successful electricity 
deregulation in Alberta could be emulated by other provinces, and suggests also that the 
less successful deregulation in Ontario can provide additional lessons.  OECD (2004) 
shows that the electricity industry in Canada, besides experiencing slow productivity 
growth in the 1990s and being subject to a large degree of regulation, is also 
characterized by high concentration (with the highest mark-ups among 10 OECD 
countries); and OECD (2003) shows that this industry also faces high restrictions on 
foreign direct investment. 
 
  Canada’s minimum wage (a weighted average of provincial minimum wages) is 
low by European standards and comparable to that in the United States (OECD 
1998:Tables 2.2 and 2.3).  This is true whether converted to U.S. dollars based on market 
exchange rates or purchasing power parity, and also in terms of the minimum wage as a 
proportion of the median wage.
9  Consequently, it is unlikely that productivity levels 
have evolved differently in the two countries because of this factor. This lies in contrast 
                                                 
9 These data are for 1997, and are not available for other years.  However, data from the OECD Labour 
Force Statistics online database, available for free at www.oecd.org under Statistics Portal and Labour, 
show that the ratio of the minimum wage to the median wage has followed a similar trend in Canada as in 
the United States over most of the past 25 years or more.  25 
to the situation in Europe where the minimum wage has risen significantly and lead to the 
disappearance of many low wage service jobs, increasing average labour productivity 
through a composition effect. 
 
  Canada’s unionization rate is more than double that in the United States.
10 The 
impact of unions on productivity is controversial. Unions can have positive effects on 
labour productivity by providing voice for workers, thereby reducing turnover, and by 
increasing wages, inducing greater substitution of capital for labour. They can also have a 
negative effect through the imposition of work rules which reduce the employer’s ability 
to reallocate workers to appropriate tasks and to adjust production quickly in response to 
changes in the external environment. The McKinsey Global Institute productivity studies 
focus on this negative role and document cases in Europe where union-imposed work 
rules have reduced productivity, particularly in low-competition industries (and cases 
where work rules actually produced world-class productivity results). However, it is 
unlikely that work rules are significantly different between most Canadian and U.S. 
industries despite the higher unionization rate in this country. Indeed, there are few 
industries in Canada that currently have rigid work rules imposed by unions.  Many of 
these rules that did exist in the past have been targeted by employers in collective 
bargaining and given up by unions. 
 
  The McKinsey Global Institute identifies zoning laws as a major impediment to 
productivity, particularly in housing and the retail sector, because such laws prevent the 
construction of large standardized housing developments and large retail outlets. Zoning 
laws in Canada are likely much closer to practices in the United States than in Europe and 
hence it is unlikely that this factor can account for much if any of the labour productivity 
gap. Indeed, the level of labour productivity in the construction industry is much higher 
in Canada than in the United States.  If this is partially due to a greater ability of the 
Canadian industry to focus on the construction of large groups of standardized houses, it 
may suggest that zoning laws are more conducive to productivity in this country than in 
the United States.   
   
II. Managerial factors 
 
  In addition to their emphasis on competitive conditions, the MGI studies also look 
at traditional drivers of productivity growth such as physical and human capital 
accumulation and innovation. The studies see managerial behaviour as the key 
determinant of the drivers and make use of the concept of “best practice” to assess 
                                                 
10 Data from the OECD Labour Force Statistics online database, available for free at www.oecd.org under 
Statistics Portal and Labour, show that the rate of union density (union members as a proportion of the 
workforce) was 28.2 per cent in Canada in 2002, compared to just 12.6 per cent for the same year in the 
United States (based on household surveys).  This compares, for example, to 22.9 per cent in Australia, 
30.4 per cent in the United Kingdom, and 78.0 per cent in Sweden.  The rate of union density declined 
slightly between 1998 and 2002 in both Canada and the United States.  The rate declined markedly in 
Canada and the United States between 1984 (the earliest year for which Canadian survey-based data are 
available) and 1998, from 34.7 per cent to 28.5 per cent and from 18.2 per cent to 13.4 per cent 
respectively.  26 
differences in the drivers across countries and implications of these differences for 
industry productivity levels. 
 
  It was earlier mentioned that the MGI found that with the right managerial 
practices, the productivity of workers on the shop floor can be identical in different 
countries even when the educational attainment of the workers differs dramatically. This 
is an important insight for the ability to raise productivity in countries with low levels of 
educational attainment, but it has little relevance for Canada-U.S. productivity 
differentials as the average educational attainment in Canada is comparable to that in the 
United States. It is of course possible that the skill levels of Canadian workers are below 
their U.S. counterparts because of a greater effort of U.S. employers in training and 
motivating their workers, although this appears unlikely. 
 
  The MGI studies of course recognize the importance of differences in capital 
intensity for industry differences in labour productivity across countries and they use the 
basic growth accounting techniques. From this perspective they would likely accept the 
results of Rao, Tang and Wang (2004), which suggest that about 30 per cent of the 
business sector Canada-U.S. labour productivity gap is attributable to the greater capital 
intensity of production in the United States.  But the MGI studies also note that in 
addition to the quantity of capital per worker employed determining productivity, it is 
also the effectiveness with which the capital is actually used in production that affects 
productivity. However, there are no obvious examples of where capital is employed much 
less productively in Canada than in the United States. 
 
  It is now well recognized that information and communication technologies 
(ICTs) accounted for much of the acceleration in productivity growth in the United States 
in the second half of the 1990s. MGI has discussed this issue in the context of the 
contribution of Wal-Mart and other retail chains to aggregate productivity growth 
achieved in part through the application of ICTs. Indeed, MGI (2001) finds that one 
quarter of the post-1995 pick-up in U.S. productivity growth was due to this one sector. 
Canada’s retail industry in 1999 attained only 85 per cent of the labour productivity level 
of its U.S. counterpart, suggesting that our lag in the application of ICTs linked to 
managerial behaviour may explain much of the continued gap. 
 
  OECD (2004:Table 2.4) shows that spending on research and development as a 
proportion of GDP in Canada is below the OECD average and far below the U.S. 
average, although this ratio has been increasing steadily since 1981 in Canada and in 
2001 exceeded that in many European countries.  However, this is not necessarily a good 
indication of how many new technologies Canadian firms adopt or how rapidly or 
effectively they adopt them, since these technologies can be imported and implemented 
with little independent research and development activity. 
 
MGI stresses the role of management in the adoption by firms of new 
technologies and in the effective use of these technologies in terms of increasing 
productivity, whether they are developed in house or imported from other industries or 
countries.  And in the MGI (1995a) study on Australia it is found that a large factor  27 
behind slow adoption of product and process innovations – and hence a large factor in the 
lower productivity performance of several Australian industries relative to the United 
States – was low management aspirations.  Such aspirations are in turn closely linked to 
the competitive environment.  It is therefore possible that the differences in competitive 
intensity between Canada and the United States, besides directly decreasing productivity 
in Canadian industries relative to their U.S. counterparts as discussed above, also 
indirectly affect productivity by lowering incentives to managers to rapidly adopt new 
technologies. 
 
III. Consumer Behaviour 
 
In addition to competitive conditions and managerial behaviour, MGI studies 
have focused on how consumers respond to the choices made by firms and the 
implications for productivity. The level of income and income distribution influence 
consumption patterns.  According to MGI, a shift in demand toward high-value goods has 
taken place in U.S. retailing and this development has contributed significantly to 
productivity growth in the sector. The increase in income inequality in the United States 
may be behind this demand shift. There has been less of an increase in income inequality 
in Canada which may account for our slower productivity growth in retail trade.  
 
  MGI productivity studies found that differences in output mixes within an 
industry based on different consumer preferences can account for productivity differences 
across countries. It is unlikely that this factor is very important in explaining industry 
productivity differences between Canada and the United States given the greater 
similarities in tastes between Canadians and Americans. Canadian tastes tend to closely 





  The McKinsey Global Institute productivity studies provide fascinating insights 
into the differences in productivity levels at the industry level between the United States 
and other major developed and developing countries. Some of these insights may be 
relevant to Canada. But given the similarities between Canada and the United States, 
which are much greater than between the United States and Europe, Japan, Brazil, and 
India, the findings of the MGI studies cannot be indiscriminately applied to Canada-U.S. 
productivity differences at the industry level. Further work is needed to dig more deeply 
into the Canada-U.S. industry productivity gaps, although the MGI studies do put 
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